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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utab 
PAUL ERNEST JOPES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE Case No. 
COUNTY RECREATION BOARD, 8702 
JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
MEADOW BROOK GOLF CLUB and 
JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. ,.. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Paul E. J opes commenced this suit to recover 
damages for personal injuries sustained in an accident 
which occurred at the Meadow Brook Golf Course in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. The case was tried before the Hon-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
orable Martin M. Larson sitting with a jury. At the close 
of the evidence each of the defendants moved the court 
for a directed verdict. The court granted each of said 
motions causing the action to be dismissed, and later denied 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. This appeal is taken 
from the orders of the court granting defendants' motions 
and denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
Because on an appeal of this type the evidence must 
be viewed by the appellate court in light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, we will state as fact those matters sup-
ported by competent credible evidence without regard to 
any dispute which may exist as to some of said facts. "R" 
refers to pages of the Record on Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is a professional golfer. On the 27th day 
of August, 1955, he was injured when he fell over a con-
crete obstruction in a narrow dimly lit hallway in the club-
house on Meadow Brook Golf Course. 
Meadow Brook Golf Course is owned and operated by 
Salt Lake County through its Recreation Board. The course 
is operated precisely the same as any private course in the 
city. Golfers are charged admission fees for the privilege 
of playing the course (R. 80, 255). Lockers are rented for 
a fee (R. 80, 259). Golf clubs, balls, tees, carts and acces-
sories are sold at competitive prices (R. 259). Golf lessons 
are given for a consideration at "rates comparable with rates 
charged at other public golf courses in this area" (Ex. 24-
P-Pg. 2, R. 255, 256). On the course is located a clubhouse 
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building. In a portion of the clubhouse is located the rental 
lockers. In another portion is located the golf shop con-
cession where golf supplies are sold. Still another portion 
of the clubhouse is leased out as a restaurant. The restau-
rant is operated by the lessee as a commercial enterprise 
for profit (R. 246, Exhibit 25-P). 
The golf course is managed by the defendant Joseph 
Michael Riley under a contract with the Salt Lake County 
Recreation Board (Ex. 24-P). Under said contract Riley 
is employed as a "Golf Professional, Instructor and Man-
ager" for the course. He is paid a salary of $3,600.00, re-
ceives a home and all utilities free of charge, and has the 
exclusive right and franchise to the following concessions 
at the course: "(a) sale or rent at reasonable charges all 
balls, clubs, golf carts, bags andjor golf accessories of any 
type, nature or description whatsoever; (b) the storage 
andjor repair, cleaning or club making of any and all golf 
clubs or accessories; (c) the exclusive group, class or indi-
vidual instruction in golf at rates comparable with rates 
charged at other public golf courses in this area * * *" 
(Ex. 24-P). The contract of employment further provides, 
inter alia, for the promotion and holding on the course of 
"one men's open or amateur golf tournaments each year." 
Riley is charged with "promotion of instruction and to 
supervise, operate, improve and maintain the golf course." 
The contract also enjoins upon Riley the duty to "maintain 
and operate at reasonable prices a first-class golf shop" 
and to "have on hand during all playing seasons an ade-
quate supply and variety of golf balls, clubs, tees, golf carts 
and other commonly used accessories for sale or rent." 
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The dining room of the clubhouse is leased to Mrs. 
Jessie Smith (Exhibit 25-P) under an instrument which 
provides for the rental of the following premises and equip-
ment: 
"The dining room, fountain and kitchen in the 
Clubhouse at the Meadow Brook Golf Course, in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, together with all furniture, 
fixtures, equipment, cooking utensils, hardware, 
glassware, and other personal property now located 
in said premises, all of which items are listed on the 
inventory hereto attached and marked Exhibit 'A'." 
Said lease provides for a rental of "five per cent of 
the gross receipts [of the lessee] derived each month 
* * * from the operation of the said premises." The 
lessor retains the right to modify the percentage of the 
gross receipts to be charged as rental. Rental is payable 
monthly with a ten day grace period. The use of the prem-
ises under said lease is defined as follows : 
"* * * [S] aid premises shall be occupied 
and used exclusively for the operation of a restau-
rant and for the sale of food, ice cream, soda, soft 
drinks, beer, candies, tobaccos and other confec-
tions." 
The lessee has the right under said lease to serve any place 
on the golf course. 
The county derives income from the operation of the 
course in substantial amounts. In 1954 it received $29,-
066.75. In 1955 $30,579.75 was collected and in 1956 the 
course brought in $38,696.62 (R. 80). The expenses of 
operation are discussed infra. 
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Based on the rentals paid to the county it appears that 
the restaurant leased to Mrs. Smith brought in $30,260.00, 
$44,102.00 and $47,642.40 for the years 1954, 1955 and 
1956 respectively, netting the county five per cent of said 
amounts ( R. 80) . 
At the time of plaintiff's injury the Utah Open Golf 
Championship was being held at the Meadow Brook Golf 
Course. This tournament was co-sponsored by the defen-
dants Meadow Brook Golf Club and Salt Lake Junior Cham-
ber of Commerce. The Utah Golf Association had "award-
ed" the tournament to Meadow Brook which undertook the 
holding of the tournament (R. 263). The use of the course 
for the holding of the tournament at Meadow Brook was 
actually considered to be an obligation on the Recreation 
Board as the owner of a course (R. 257, 261). Speaking of 
the attitude of the Recreation Board and himself towards 
the tournament at Meadow Brook, Riley said : 
"* * * because of our obligation to golf as 
a whole * * * the picture of golf * * * 
and they feel the same as I do that, each club should 
take a turn at putting this tournament over to stim-
ulate and boost playing of golf; * * *" (R. 
257). 
The tournament at first was to be sponsored by the 
defendant Meadow Brook Golf Club (R. 233) . The Salt 
Lake Jaycees, however, offered to co-sponsor the tourna-
ment for one-half of the profits (R. 233, 235). Income in 
the amount of $10,655.10 was derived from the holding of 
the tournament (R. 76). The income was received and 
expenses paid by the co-sponsors. The profits were divided 
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equally between Meadow Brook Golf Club and the Salt 
Lake Jaycees (R. 80, 235). Each netted about $900.00 
profit (R. 74, 296, 311). 
The general planning and management of the tourna-
ment was under the charge of the general committee com-
posed of Carman Kipp of the Jaycees; Jack Gilbert of 
Meadow Brook and Riley (R. 234, 286). About Riley's 
place on the committee and the attitude of the two co-spon-
sors toward him, he said: 
"They were using me of my knowledge and ex-
perience in running open tournaments" (R. 236). 
The general committee in turn selected subcommittees such 
as publicity, finance and social (R. 236, 237). 
A number of so-called "sponsors" (not to be confused 
with the co-sponsors of the tournament) were contacted 
each of whom paid $25.00 in exchange for having his or 
its name printed in the program (R. 287). Policies of the 
tournament were formed by Kipp, Gilbert and Riley on the 
general committee and the subcommittees worked under 
their supervision to accomplish the work of the tournament 
(R. 234, 236, 237). Programs w·ere prepared, scoreboards 
erected, signs constructed and the greens put in readiness 
for the play of the tournament. Invitations were sent out 
to professional and amateur golfers. The plaintiff received 
a written invitation and also a personal invitation from 
Riley to enter and participate in the tournament (R. 114, 
245). All participants (including plaintiff) were required 
to pay an admission fee of $10.00 to play in the open tour-
nament (R. 115, 245). The public was invited to view the 
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tournament but was admitted only upon the purchase of 
spectators tickets (R. 245). Participants and spectators 
alike were allowed full use of the golf clubhouse facilities 
(R. 242). The golf shop, rest rooms, and locker rooms were, 
of course, an essential element of the facilities for the hold-
ing of the tournament. The dining room was used for cer-
tain activities of the tournament (including a "Calcutta" 
and dinner) and the restaurant was patronized by both 
golfer and spectator (R. 246). 
Mr. Jopes was injured in a narrow hallway of the club-
house which connects the restaurant with the golf shop 
and locker rooms (See Exhibit 1-P). This passageway is 
approximately 18 feet in length, four feet in width and runs 
in a north-south direction. At the time of the accident there 
was no artificial light fixture in the passage to furnish 
artificial light (R. 120). The east wall of the passage was 
one of the exterior walls of the building and was constructed 
of glass block so as to permit the passage of natural light 
into the hallway. Said glass block was laid on a concrete 
foundation approximately 18 inches high. At the north 
end of the hallway a concrete obstruction about 18 inches 
in height protrudes into the traveled portion of the hall-
way one foot or more. The width of the hallway from the 
outer edge of this obstruction to the west edge of the hall-
way is about two feet ten inches (Ex. 1-P). There is a con-
siderable amount of traffic in the hallway and people fre-
quently pass each other therein. Before the commencement 
of the tournament Riley, one of the members of the general 
committee, caused a large scoreboard to be constructed and 
placed on the outside of the east wall of the passage com-
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pletely covering the glass block on said wall (Ex. 1-P). 
This scoreboard which was attached directly to the glass 
block prevented the passage of natural light through said 
glass block and into the hallway. 
The accident occurred about 3:00p.m. on the 27th day 
of August, 1955 (R. 116). At the time of the accident plain-
tiff had completed a round of golf and had gone into the 
golf shop to secure change in order to pay his caddy. There 
was no change in the golf shop so he went into the restau-
rant where he purchased a paper cup of beer and secured 
change for a $20.00 bill. The accident occurred on his re-
turn from the restaurant to the golf shop. After J opes left 
the restaurant, he started down the hallway walking north. 
When he had reached about the middle of the hall two men 
came out of the locker room at the north end of the passage 
and walked south toward him. In order to pass them in 
the hallway J opes walked to the east side of the passage. 
As he came to the north end of the passage his foot struck 
the concrete obstruction throwing him violently forward 
and causing his shoulder to strike a 4x4 post at the north 
end of the hall. This blow resulted in the severe injuries 
suffered by plaintiff. These injuries necessitated surgery 
and pinning of the shoulder and resulted in a permanent 
partial disability at the shoulder joint. 
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that it was difficult to 
see in the hallway and that below the concrete foundation 
where the obstruction was located it was "very dark" (R. 
123, 277. 278). These witnesses though looking down the 
hallway were unable to see the obstruction with the light 
conditions as they were (R. 123, 278). There was evidence 
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that at least two persons had tripped over the obstruction 
before plaintiff's accident (R. 277, 278). Plaintiff had 
passed through the hallway before but had not noticed the 
obstruction-probably because of the light conditions and 
because he had not been forced to walk on the east side of 
the passage by other traffic. There were no signs or other 
warnings whatever giving the traveler notice of the ob-
struction in the hallway. 
Although the absence of any artificial light in the hall-
way and the presence of the concrete obstruction contrib-
uted considerably to the hazard, perhaps the greatest single 
affirmative act contributing thereto was the construction 
and erection of a scoreboard covering all of the glass portion 
of the east wall of said passage. It is clear that the score-
board was constructed and erected for the sole purpose of 
the Utah Open Golf Tournament. On this point Riley said: 
(R. 260) 
"Q. Now, who made the scoreboard? 
"A. I had it made for the express purpose of 
using in the Utah Open Tournament, and it was 
made for me by the County Recreation Maintenance 
Department.'' 
The board was erected about two weeks before the 
tournament (R. 242, 243). Although actual erection of the 
board was made by county employees, it is clear that its 
placement was taken up by Riley with the other two mem-
bers of the general committee as one of the items of business 
of the tournament (R. 243, 244, 309). Kipp did not re-
member this, but Gilbert did (R. 309). Gilbert remembers 
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a discussion as to the placement of the sign in some place 
out of the wind. (Ibid.) As a matter of fact Riley testified 
that the matter was even taken up with the general com-
mittee after it had been placed (R. 244). Riley's suggestion 
for placement of the board and his act in having it placed 
where it was brings to mind his statement that: 
(R. 236) 
"They [The Golf Club and the Jaycees] were 
using me of my knowledge and experience in running 
open tournaments." 
It is clear that both Gilbert and Kipp of the general 
commitee knew where the board was placed and made no 
objections to its placement (R. 269, 310). It is also clear 
that these men as well as numerous other Jaycees and mem-
bers of the Golf Club knew of the light conditions in the 
hallway following the erection of the scoreboard. 
At the close of the evidence the trial court refused to 
allow the case to go to the jury. The question now before 
this court is whether under any view of the facts the plain-
tiff could recover against any one or more of the defendants. 
If so, he is entitled to a new trial. "Plaintiff is entitled 
to have the trial court, and this court on review, consider 
all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to present and 
every inference and intendment therefrom in the light most 
favorable to him." Abdulkadir v. The Western Pacific 
Railroad Company, (Utah, 1957), 318 P. 2d 339; Morris 
v. Farnsworth Motel, (Utah, 1953), 259 P. 2d 297. We 
think that the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on 
the issue of liability as to each of the defendants. The fol-
lowing pages will demonstrate this. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT SALT 
LAKE COUNTY. 
(1) The Maintenance and Operation of Meadow 
Brook Golf Course is a Proprietary Function 
To Which the Doctrine of Governmental Im-
munity Does Not Extend. 
(2) Salt Lake County in Leasing Premises For a 
Restaurant Was Acting in a Proprietary Ca-
pacity and is Charged with the Same Liability 
in Said Operation as Any Private Landlord 
Would Be. 
(3) There is Ample Evidence From Which the 
Jury Could Have Found That Salt Lake 
County Was Guilty of Negligence Which 
Proximately Contributed to Plaintiff's In-
juries. 
(4) The Evidence Does Not Compel a Conclusion 
That Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory 
Negligence as a Matter of Law. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JO-
SEPH MICHAEL RILEY. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT MEA-
DOW BROOK GOLF CLUB. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JUN-
IOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT SALT 
LAKE COUNTY. 
(1) The Maintenance and Operation of Meadow 
Brook Golf Course is a Proprietary Function 
To Which the Doctrine of Governmental Im-
munity Does Not Extend. 
We have already stated that Meadow Brook Golf Course 
is owned and operated by Salt Lake County through its 
Recreation Board. The course is operated precisely the 
same as any private course in the city. Golfers are charged 
"green fees" for the privilege of playing the course. Lock-
ers are rented for a fee. Golf clubs, balls, tees, carts and 
accessories are sold in the golf shop. The clubhouse located 
on the premises is devoted almost exclusively to commercial 
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concessions and enterprises. A portion of said clubhouse 
contains lockers which are rented to golfers. In another 
portion is located the golf shop concession where golf sup-
plies are sold as a profit making or business undertaking. 
Still another part of the clubhouse is leased by the county 
as a restaurant. The restaurant, as the golf shop, is oper-
ated by the lessee as any other commercial restaurant. In 
1954 the county deposited in its treasury as revenue derived 
from the operation of the course the sum of $29,066.75. In 
1955 this revenue was increased to the sum of $30,579.75, 
and in 1956 the sum of $38,696.62 was taken in by the 
county (R. 80). The expenses incurred in operating the 
course amounted to $50,309.11 in 1956, and were about the 
same in 1954 and 1955 (R. 80, 81). 
We think the conclusion of the trial court that the 
county in operating Meadow Brook Golf Course is acting 
in a proprietary capacity is wholly unsupported in fact and 
law. Statutes pertinent to the suit against the county are 
§17-15-10, U. C. A., 1953, (providing that a county may 
sue or be sued), §11-2-3 (authorizing county to act through 
recreation board), §11-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, (authorizing 
maintenance of facilities such as golf courses) . The ex-
penses of the operation are paid by the county (R. 80, See 
§11-2-7, U. C. A., 1953) and the revenue derived is deposited 
in the county treasury (R. 80, 255). 
The principal of sovereign immunity is a common law 
doctrine which insulates municipalities and agencies of the 
government from liability in tort while engaged in the per-
formance of governmental functions. From the very in-
ception of the doctrine it has been recognized that immunity 
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does not extend to activities performed by the sovereign 
which are private or proprietary in nature. 
The distinction between proprietary and governmental 
functions is most commonly discussed in connection with 
suits against a city or municipality. However, the propo-
sition that a county as well as a city may act in a private 
or proprietary capacity and is liable for its torts when so 
acting is firmly established in this country. The case law 
on this subject is collected in annotations at 101 A. L. R. 
1166 and 16 A. L. R. 2d 1079 (See also A. L. R. 2d Sup-
plement Service). It appears from these cases that the 
question has been before the appellate courts in at least 
twenty different jurisdictions. With the exception of some 
Texas decisions and Georgia (where a statute controls), all 
of the other decisions referred to in the above annotations 
(or later decisions of the same court) have rejected the 
contention that the powers of a county are purely govern-
mental and recognized that counties, as cities, may act in 
a private as well as a public capacity and that when so 
acting the county has no immunity from suit. The western 
states of California, Idaho, Nevada and Montana have all 
recognized this principal of law. A lengthy analysis of the 
cases is set forth in Granite Oil Securities v. Douglas 
County, 67 Nev. 388, 219 P. 2d 191, where it was concluded 
as follows: 
"While it is said that the doctrine holding coun-
ties, liable for torts committed in the exercise of 
proprietary functions has been of much later devel-
opment than a similar doctrine for municipalities, 
we find that doctrine clearly expressed in the early 
case of Hannon v. County of St. Louis, 62 Mo. 313, 
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decided in 1876 * * * We cite these as among 
the early cases. Later cases are overwhelmingly in 
support of the liability of counties for tort when 
acting in their proprietary capacity. (Citing cases.)" 
See also the following cases: 
Coburn v. San Mateo County, 75 Fed. 520; Jones v. Jeffer-
son County, 206 Ala. 13, 89 So. 174; Peterson v. Bannock 
County, 61 Idaho 419, 102 P. 2d 647; Johnson v. Billings, 
101 Mont. 462, 54 P. 2d 579; Calkins v. Newton, 36 Cal. 
App. 2d 262, 97 P. 2d 523. 
Although this Court has not directly passed upon the 
question it is evident from the case of Lund v. Salt Lake 
County, 58 Utah 546, 200 Pac. 510, that the Court recog-
nizes the almost universal rule of county tort liability. In 
that case, though holding that the county was not liable 
because its act in maintaining a private water system and 
furnishing water for hire was without statutory authority 
and hence "ultra vires," the court said: 
"* * * If they were authorized to engage 
in such business, as was Salt Lake City in the Brown 
case, cited by plaintiff, we see no objection to ap-
plying the common law doctrine of respondeat su-
perior and holding the municipality liable. * * *" 
It should be noted at this point that the instant case is not 
a situation involving an "ultra vires" act as was the case 
in Lund v. Salt Lake County, supra. The legislature has 
authorized the county to operate and maintain facilities 
such as golf courses ( § 11-2-1, 3 U. C. A., 1953) just as 
the city was authorized to maintain and operate swimming 
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• pools (§ 10-8-9, U. C. A., 1953) in the cases of Griffin v. 
Salt Lake City and Burton v. Salt Lake City, infra. In the 
Griffin and Burton cases it was held that the maintenance 
and operation of a swimming pool by the city pursuant to 
statutory authority is proprietary in nature and that the 
city is liable for its negligence in said operation. The courts 
have uniformly recognized that the conduct of certain 
authorized enterprises by cities and counties are proprietary 
in nature and in such instances the city or county in ques-
tion is held liable for torts committed in the operation of 
such enterprises. Having demonstrated that the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority supports the proposition that a 
county (as a city) may act in a proprietary as well as a 
governmental capacity, we pass to a consideration of the 
character of the operation in the instant case. 
Traditionally a governmental undertaking is one which 
is operated for the protection of persons and property within 
the limits of the governmental unit. The most typical ex-
amples are perhaps police and fire protection. Although 
many of the old decisions assign as the reason for the 
doctrine the theory that "the king can do no wrong" prob-
ably the real motive for affording immunity to the sover-
eign while engaged in a governmental undertaking is that the 
function is not only enjoined by law upon the city without 
its choice but it is also a necessary function, the perform-
ance of which should not be hindered by vexatious lawsuits. 
A private or proprietary undertaking on the other hand is 
a function the performance of which is not enjoined by law 
upon the governmental unit and one which a private cor-
poration, association or other form of business might also 
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conduct. The hardship and injuries of the immunity doc-
trine have been discussed and deplored by many a judge 
and textwriter and at least one former justice of this court 
has cried out against the extension of the doctrine beyond 
its present limits. See concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe 
in Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P. 2d 800. 
As we will point out there is no decision in this state or 
any other state of the union which extends the cloak of 
governmental immunity to a city or county engaged in the 
operation of a public golf course for admission to which 
a fee is charged. Neither the facts nor rational of any de-
cision of this court would extend the doctrine so far. A 
golf course as the court judicially knows is a type of opera-
tion traditionally and commonly undertaken by private 
organizations or associations of persons. 
Although the financial success is not as significant 
a factor as the character of the undertaking in determining 
whether a given activity is proprietary or governmental 
the financial picture is not insignificant. In this connection 
we point out that the revenue derived by Salt Lake County 
in the operation of Meadow Brook Golf Course is very sub-
stantial and cannot be said to be merely incidental and 
nominal. The course is a relatively new course (R. 226, 
227) and after only a few years of operation is already 
bringing in over $38,500 per year. The admitted facts indi-
cate that the costs of operation remain about the same but 
the income continues to increase. Given the same growth 
had over the last year for which we have figures the County 
should profit approximately $4,500.00 this year from the 
operation of the course and these profits will continue to 
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increase as the course grows in popularity. But even more 
significant than the great amount of income derived from 
the operation of the course is its character as an enterprise 
that is not open to the public generally except upon the pay-
ment of an admission fee. Just as significant is the fact 
that ordinary commercial enterprises are operated on the 
premises. 
The precise question now before the court was decided 
in Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443. In 
that case Justice Frick holding that a municipally owned 
and operated swimming pool was operated in a private 
capacity said: 
"* * * Is it not pertinent to ask, What gov-
ernmental function does Salt Lake City exercise in 
conducting the bathhouses and swimming pools in 
question? In what way does it discharge any gov-
ernmental function? What is it that it governs or 
regulates or controls of a public or governmental 
character? In view of the allegations of the com-
plaint, does the city not own, operate, and conduct 
the bathhouses and swimming pools in question pre-
cisely the same as they would be conducted under 
private ownership? We confess our utter inability 
to perceive any act of a governmental nature which 
the city exercises in owning, operating, and conduct-
ing the bathhouses and swimming pools referred to 
in the complaint." 
In the later case of Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 
94, 176 P. 2d 156, the court again ruled that a municipally 
owned swimming pool which charged an admission fee is 
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a private or proprietary undertaking. In that case the court 
said: 
"This is not a case of a swimming pool oper-
ated without charge in connection with some park; 
but an enterprise apparently in competition with 
private business, and one which could likely be oper-
ated as successfully in private ownership as in 
municipal ownership. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
How this can be said to be a governmental enterprise 
is beyond our ability to comprehend. Is it not pertinent to 
ask here, the same questions asked by the court in the Bur-
ton case, i. e.: In what way does the city discharge any 
governmental function? Is there any reason why this en-
terprise could not be operated as well in private ownership 
as in municipal ownership? The maintenance and opera-
tion of a golf course is not a duty which devolves upon the 
city. It is not part of the city's business which is the pro-
tection of persons and property, the preservation of peace 
and other legitimate exercises of the police power. The 
doctrine of governmental immunity has been extended (to 
the dismay of some members of the court) to include the 
furnishing of free recreational acivities such as free public 
parks or free public sleigh riding hills. Husband v. Salt 
Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 P. 2d 491; Alder v. Salt Lake 
City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac. 1102; Davis v. Provo City Corpo-
ration, 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P. 2d 415. This is decidedly an 
extension of the doctrine, however, which has been care-
fully limited to situations where the facility is provided 
free of charge to the public generally. The distinction be-
tween a public park and a golf course is pointed out in the 
California case of Plaza v. City of San Mateo, infra. We 
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have found no decision in this jurisdiction or in any other 
state of the union which allows the conduct of a golf course 
under the cloak of governmental immunity. 
The character of such an operation as governmental 
or proprietary has been considered by the appellate courts 
of Ohio and California. In each of these cases it was held 
that municipal operation of a golf course is a proprietary 
function. 
In Gorsuch v. City of Springfield, (Ohio) 61 N. E. 2d 
898, the facts were strikingly similar to those of the instant 
case. The City of Springfield, Ohio, operated a golf course 
and clubhouse. Income from the operation was a little over 
$11,500.00 for the years in question. Said income was 
raised as it was in the instant case through green fees, 
clubhouse fees and the sale of golf supplies. 
The Ohio trial court, notwithstanding the fact that the 
land on which the course was operated had been deeded to 
Springfield in trust for the free use of the public as a park 
and playground, ruled as a matter of law that the operation 
was proprietary in nature. The appellate court affirmed 
saying: 
"It is sufficient for the present case to say that 
if the city in the maintenance and operation of its 
municipal golf course was directly compensated or 
benefited by growth and prosperity of the city and 
its inhabitants and the city had an election to do 
or omit to do the acts set forth herein as shown by 
the evidence, the function is private and proprietary. 
"It cannot be said that the city was enjoined 
by any law to maintain and operate the golf course 
and club house in Snyder Park. It had an election 
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to do or to omit to do so. * * * The city was 
benefited by revenue received in the operation of 
a business which is customarily carried on by pri-
vate persons and corporations in their proprietary 
capacity. * * *" 
In the instant case income was over $38,500.00 from the 
same sources except that in the instant case Salt Lake 
County derives income not only from the sources derived 
by the Springfield course but also from the commercial 
operation of a restaurant. 
California has adopted the same holding in the case 
of Plaza v. City of San Mateo, (Cal. 1954), 266 P. 2d 523. 
In the Plaza case plaintiff was struck and injured by a golf 
ball while near her car in a parking lot adjacent to the golf 
course operated by the defendant city. She had just com-
pleted a round of golf at the time of her injury for which 
she had paid the required admission fee to the course. A 
demurrer to the complaint was sustained below. The ap-
pellate court held as a matter of law that the operation of 
a golf course is a private or proprietary undertaking. In 
so doing it distinguished those cases wherein it had been 
held that the operation of public parks and playgrounds 
is governmental in character. The reasoning of the court 
was as follows : 
"The underlying purpose behind the playing 
of a game of golf, however, is undoubtedly pleasure 
or amusement. True, it provides some exercise and 
gets the player out into the fresh air and sunshine, 
but a walk in the park would serve the same purpose. 
Golf is a game of skill and rivalry, with a decided 
social aspect, and it is doubtful that most people who 
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play consider health benefits to be the primary ob-
jective. Some even ride between shots in small ve-
hicles designed for this purpose, and have caddies to 
carry their clubs and equipment, which indicates 
that exercise is for them not the foremost considera-
tion. A golf course does not serve the public gener-
ally but only those who play the game. It is designed 
for a single purpose, while a public park is devoted 
to no specific use and serves many purposes for the 
public in general. Many private golf courses are 
maintained, some for profit, and others as an adjunct 
to private clubs or associations. It is true that a 
public golf course undoubtedly makes the sport avail-
able to a segment of our population to which private 
courses would not be accessible, but this alone does 
not constitute it a governmental function. It is ac-
tually in cornpe#tion with other courses, and in its 
clubhouse commercial enterprises usually are carried 
on where commercial rates are charged for commodi-
ties and services." (Emphasis added.) 
We submit that the operation of the Meadow Brook 
Golf Course is a proprietary function which differs in no 
sense from the private operation of other golf courses. It 
follows, we submit, that the trial court erred in dismissing 
the complaint as to Salt Lake County on the theory of gov-
ernmental immunity. 
(2) Salt Lake County in Leasing Premises For a 
Restaurant Was Acting in a Proprietary Ca-
pacity and is Charged with the Same Liability 
in Said Operation as Any Private Landlord 
Would Be. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the maintenance of a 
golf course is a governmental function there is another 
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reason why the county cannot escape liability on the theory 
of sovereign immunity. At the time of the plaintiff's acci-
dent a restaurant was being operated on the golf course 
premises by a lessee of Salt Lake County. This was a busi-
ness independent of the golf course which, as will be shown, 
actually brought in more revenue to the operator than did 
the course to the County. Salt Lake County (through its 
Recreation Board) was in every sense of the word a land-
lord. 
Mrs. Smith leased "the dining room, fountain and 
kitchen in the clubhouse at the Meadow Brook Golf Course 
* * *" (Exhibit 25-P). The rental reserved to the 
county was five per cent of the gross receipts of the lessee 
payable monthly. 
The premises were leased for a specific purpose de-
fined as follows : 
"[S] aid premises shall be occupied and used 
exclusively for the operation of a restaurant and for 
the sale of food, ice cream, soda, soft drinks, beer, 
candies, tobaccos and other confections." 
The other provisions of the lease are such as would be 
expected to be found in any commercial lease. 
The county derived income from the lease as follows: 
1954 
1955 
1956 
(R. 80) 
$1,513.00 
$2,205.00 
$2,382.12 
It appears from these rentals that the restaurant grossed 
$30,260.00, $44,102.00 and $47,642.40 for the years 1954, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
1955 and 1956, respectively. This operation is not merely 
incidental to the operation of the course. The restaurant 
actually produced more revenue than the golf course. 
Leasing of premises to a private individual for a profit 
making enterprise is not a governmental function. The 
county, as a landlord, acts in a private or proprietary ca-
pacity in every sense of the word. From the early develop-
ment of the common law doctrine of immunity, it has been 
recognized that the letting of premises for hire is a private 
and not a public undertaking. 
In the early case of Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 
23, 41 Am. Rep. 185, the City of New Bedford let a room 
in the City Hall to a poultry association together with the 
services of a janitor, who by appointment of the city had 
charge of the building. The plaintiff was injured by the 
negligence of the janitor in lighting and heating the rooms. 
The court holding that these facts were sufficient to estab-
lish the liability of the city said: 
"A city or town is not liable to a private citizen 
for an injury caused by any defect or want of repair 
in a city or town hall or other public building erected 
and used solely for municipal purposes, or for negli-
gence of its agents in the management of such build-
ings. This is because it is not liable to private ac-
tions for omission or neglect to perform a corporate 
duty imposed by general laws upon all cities and 
towns alike, from the performance of which it de-
rives no compensation. 
"But when a city or town does not devote such 
building exclusively to municipal uses. but lets it, or 
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a part of it, for its own advantage and emolument, 
by receiving rents, or otherwise, it is liable while it is 
so let in the same manner as a private owner would 
be. Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; S. C., Am. 
Rep. 485; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; S. C., 23 
Am. Rep. 332." 
A similar situation was involved in the early Utah 
case of Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 Pac. 1050. 
In that case Salt Lake City had rented a portion of the City 
Hall to the legislature. Plaintiff, a legislator, was attend-
ing a night session. There was an outhouse in the rear of 
the building behind the City Jail. There was a light in the 
hallway of the building but none in the jail yard where 
the outhouse was located. Heeding a call of nature, plaintiff 
went out into the darkened yard, got off of the path and 
fell into an open hatchway. Our Supreme Court affirmed 
a verdict for plaintiff. It should be noted that in this case 
the rooms let to the legislature were in the City Hall, a 
building used for governmental purposes. Furthermore, 
plaintiff's injury did not occur on the demised part of the 
premises. The court assumed that the city was liable as any 
other landlord would be. At the outset of the opinion the 
court pointed out : 
"It is admitted in the record that the defendant 
rented a portion of the City Hall to the legislature, 
as a legislative chamber, for the purpose of holding 
its session in 1889 therein, and received rent for the 
same, and that the legislature was rightfully there." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Referring to the place where the accident occurred the court 
said: 
"The yard was appurtenant to the hall, and, in 
the absence of any restrictions, the members of the 
legislature had a right to make a proper use there-
of;" 
The discussion of the duty of the city to make the yard 
reasonably safe and to have the same properly lighted is 
pertinent to the facts of the instant case. The Lowe case 
stands for the proposition that a public body in acting as 
a landlord is liable as any other landlord would be. 
A good general discussion of the theory and develop-
ment of the doctrine of governmental immunity is contained 
in the case of Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 
163 Pac. 670. In that case the City of Long Beach had let 
a public auditorium built and maintained by it to an organ-
ization known as the Sons of St. George for the purpose of 
celebrating the birthday of Queen Victoria. The auditorium 
was open to the general public after the members of this 
organization, their paraders and friends had been admitted. 
Plaintiff's intestate was killed when a pier adjacent to the 
auditorium collapsed. In an opinion holding the munici-
pality liable, the court said : 
"Again it is important to note that the true 
test does not rest upon the determination as to 
whether or not the municipality is reaping a mone-
tary gain. A very large class of cases arises where 
this fact is established, as where parts of public 
buildings, such as a city hall, m·e leased or rented 
to private individuals, when it is uniformly held that 
the city in doing this thing is acting in a private 
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capacity. But while it is true that the exaction of 
a rent or the making of a private profit is a very 
potent factor in determining the character of the 
act, the converse is not true. In other words, the 
act does not become governmental merely by virtue 
of the fact that the city from the performance of it 
reaps no direct pecuniary return. It may be and is 
equally a private, proprietary act if no financial 
return at all be exacted, or if the financial return 
which is exacted does not amount to a profit on the 
enterprise. * * *" 
See also Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal. App. 2d 651, 
129 P. 2d 511. 
There is one Utah decision which should be distin-
guished from the instant case. In Ramirez v. Ogden City, 
3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P. 2d 463, part of a public recreation 
hall was used by a Mexican group for a dance. The hall was 
usually open to the public free of charge, but on this occa-
sion the city received $15.00. The court regarded this pay-
ment as "merely nominal" or de minim us. Justice Crockett 
took care to point out those facts showing "large expendi-
tures made by the city for its maintenance, coupled with 
lack of income therefrom, except the incidental fees re-
ferred to which may be regarded as merely nominal * * *" 
It was concluded that the general character of the auditor-
ium was governmental and that the $15.00 fee did not 
deprive the operation of this character. This is not the 
situation with which the court is confronted in the instant 
case. Here the premises were let under a written lease for 
an appreciable amount over a period of years to an enter-
prise not interested in furnishing education or recreation 
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but only in making a profit in the commercial restaurant 
business. 
Even if we make the assumption (which, we submit, 
is an erroneous assumption) that the maintenance of a golf 
course by a public body is a governmental function, still 
there is no reason why a proprietary activity cannot be 
conducted at the same time on the same premises or even 
under the same roof. The authorities fully support this 
proposition. 
In Engles v. City of New York, 6 N.Y. S. 2d 436, plain-
tiff was injured on alighting from an elevator to visit a 
pay patient in a municipal hospital. A verdict for her was 
affirmed on appeal. The court noted that the general op-
eration of the hospital was a governmental function. As 
to paying patients, however, the court said the city was 
acting in a private capacity in the performance of which 
it owed a duty of due care both to the patient and her visi-
tor. The court said: 
"No one will contend that if a city conducts an 
activity for profit, that it is performing a govern-
mental function. That the city enjoys both powers 
-proprietary or governmental or public. It may ex-
ercise those two powers under the same roof-at one 
institution." 
The principal is also well illustrated by the New Bedford 
and Salt Lake City cases cited supra, where the accidents 
occurred in or about the city hall. 
In Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal. App. 2d 336, 
223 P. 2d 639, plaintiff was injured in a parking lot on city 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
property while en route to a community theatre situated 
in a public park. Defendant urged that the theatre was 
situated in a public park where public recreational facili-
ties were located and that the theatre performed the same 
general function as the park and was hence maintained in 
a governmental capacity. In ruling that the theatre was 
operated in a private capacity the court quoted from the 
Chafor case as follows : 
" 'True, it was maintained for the benefit of 
the municipality in the sense that it afforded the 
populace a meeting place for many forms of amuse-
ment and instruction. But in all these respects it 
differed no whit from any other auditorium or as-
sembly hall built and maintained by private capital 
for the same purposes.'" (Emphasis added.) 
The Defendant city had urged that the accident did not 
actually occur on the theatre premises and that the parking 
lot was strictly a governmental operation. In answer to 
this the court said : 
"The fact that the parking lot may also be used 
by persons using governmental facilities operated 
by appellant in the very park in which the commun-
ity theatre is located, would not seem to alter its 
proprietary character when used by patrons of the 
theatre. 
"As stated by this court in Dineen v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. App. 2d 486, 101 
P. 2d 736, judicial authorities in other jurisdictions 
* * * establish the rule that if a governmental 
agency permits part or whole of a building to be 
used for other than governmental purposes, then the 
agency is generally liable in tort to any person who 
is injured by reason of the negligent maintenance 
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or operation of the building, if such injury occurs 
in the common hallways, passages or yard of such 
building or in the portion used for nongovernmental 
purposes." 
The court reasoned that the parking lot fell within the 
spirit of the rule. In determining whether the theatre was 
governmental or proprietary, the argument that the build-
ing was used in connection with a public park did not 
impress the court. That argument was dismissed with the 
following language. 
"It is the nature of the activity, not its location, 
nor by what department carried on, nor the fact that 
the facility may also be used for governmental pur-
poses, that determines its proprietary character." 
From the explanation of the law in the foregoing cases 
including the Salt Lake City case, it seems to us apparent 
that the leasing of the premises in the instant case was an 
act performed by Salt Lake County in its proprietary ca-
pacity. The fact that the restaurant is located on a golf 
course does not alter the fact that it is a private undertak-
ing. This lease does not differ from any other lease entered 
into for profit, nor does the restaurant differ from any 
other commercial restaurant. 
We submit that the conclusion is inescapable that the 
county in leasing its premises for a fee is liable as any 
other landlord would be. As a landlord, one of the duties 
of the county was to maintain the hallways furnishing in-
gress and egress to the demised premises in a reasonably 
safe condition. This is pertinent to the instant case because 
piainVff was injured as he was leaving the restaurant by 
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a hallway commonly used as a means of ingress and egress 
to and from said restaurant. 
(3) There is Ample Evidence From Which the 
Jury Could Have Found That Salt Lake 
County Was Guilty of Negligence Which 
Proximately Contributed to Plaintiff's In-
juries. 
There is ample evidence from which a jury might have 
found that a dangerous condition existed in the hallway 
where plaintiff was injured and that said condition was 
caused or was allowed to exist as a result of the negligence 
of Salt Lake County all of which contributed as a proximate 
cause to plaintiff's injury. 
The hallway where plaintiff was injured was approxi-
mately four feet in width (three and one-half feet at the 
north end) and 18 feet in length. It runs in a north-south 
direction (See Exhibit 1-P). The east wall of said hallway 
is constructed of glass brick which ordinarily would allow 
some light to come into the passage. At the time of the 
accident this wall was covered by a scoreboard which ob-
structed the passage of light into the hallway. There were 
no artificial lights in the hallway itself. Approximately 
ten feet north of the south end of the hallway a large piece 
of concrete approximately 18 inches in height protrudes out 
into the passageway for over one foot. As the passageway 
furnished a means of ingress and egress to and from the 
golf shop and coffee shop, persons were often required to 
pass each other therein. There is scarcely room at the north 
end of the hallway for two persons to pass side by side 
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without coming into contact with the concrete abutment. 
With regard to the light conditions in the hallway plaintiff 
testified as follows : 
(R. 122) 
"Q. Now, what was the condition with respect 
to light in that hallway on the occasion of this acci-
dent? 
"A. Well, on the occasion of this accident, it 
was about three o'clock in the afternoon ; so, the sun 
would be shining from the west over this way, not 
letting too much light in from the-from any place 
there-because it was shining over the clubhouse, 
and was especially very dark along the foot of that. 
Up a little higher, you could see very well, but not 
down lower; not along the passageway, you couldn't 
see very well. 
"Q. What was the condition of the light with 
respect to the area below this concrete wall that 
supports the glass brick? 
"A. It was very difficult to see. 
"Q. Were you watching where you were going 
when-
" A. Yes, I was watching where I was going. 
As I explained, I had spikes on, so you have to be 
especially cautious when walking with pair of golf 
spikes on. 
"Q. Did you see that abutment before you 
tripped on it? 
"A. I certainly did not, because I don't believe 
I tried to trip over it on purpose. 
"Q. What was on the floor there, if anything, 
Mr. J opes, that you can recall; what type of material 
was the floor? 
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"A. I am not exactly sure what was on the 
floor. There seemed to be that-there might be 
some rubber matting; sometimes there are in golf 
shops, and so forth, where people will not slip." 
Mr. Paul Gore, a professional golfer who played in the 
Utah Open testified as follows : 
(R. 277, 278) 
"Q. Now, Mr. Gore, you participated in the 
play of '55, Utah Open at Meadow Brook Golf 
Course? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. Were you on the premises there on all of 
the days that, on which that tournament was held? 
"A. Yes, I came here to play practice round, 
as a witness, and played through the entire tourna-
ment. 
"Q. Did you have occasion to pass through 
that hallway that we have been speaking about 
where the plaintiff was injured? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. Did you observe the condition with respect 
to the light in that hallway, on the various days of 
the tournament? 
"A. It seemed very dark to me. 
"Q. Well, was the condition the same through-
out those various days? 
"A. There were never any changes made that 
I saw. 
"Q. Did you pass through the hall on each 
day of the tournament? 
"A. I don't think I did the first two days, no. 
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"Q. Now, calling your attention, Mr. Gore, to 
the afternoon of Thursday, August 25, you have 
occasion to pass through the hallway on that after-
noon? 
"A. Yes ; I went from the lunch room to the 
locker room. 
"Q. And will you relate what occurred? 
"A. Well, I tripped over that abutment and 
almost fell to the floor. 
"Q. Then, what did you do after that? 
"A. I went on into the locker room and was 
there about ten minutes; then-
"Q. Then, what did you do? 
"A. I came back out to go back to the lunch 
room. 
"Q. What, if anything, happened then? 
"A. Well, there was another fellow came down 
the hallway and started to pass me ; I held to him, 
but he tripped over the abutment, too, and I helped 
hold him up, so we didn't fall to the floor. 
"Q. Was it sufficiently light in that hallway 
to see those abutments-
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, just a minute-
"Q. -in your opinion? 
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I will object to 
it as calling for a conclusion. 
"MR. MACFARLANE : I will submit it, your 
Honor ; he has testified he was there. 
"THE COURT: Well, he may testify as to what 
the condition of the light was, but you are-his 
opinion as to whether or not there was sufficient 
light or not is just calling for a conclusion, and is 
not proper. 
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"Q. All right, did you see the abutment before 
you tripped over it? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Were you watching where you were going? 
"Yes ; looking straight ahead." 
On cross examination Mr. Gore testified as follows: 
(R. 229) 
"Q. What did you trip over as you went 
through that hall, Mr. Gore? 
"A. I tripped over an abutment. 
"Q. How do you know it was an 'abutment'? 
"A. Because I got out and felt up over it. 
"Q. Got down and felt what? 
"A. I wanted to know what it was; couldn't 
see it clearly enough to know what it was." 
Plaintiff was a patron of the lessee having made a pur-
chase just before the injury. He was also a patron of the 
golf course for admission to which he had paid a fee of 
$10.00. Under these circumstances he was a business visi-
tor as a matter of law. Hayward v. Downing, 112 Utah 
508, 189 P. 2d 442; In re Wimmers Estate, 111 Utah 444, 
182 P. 2d 119; Restatement of Torts, §332. The duty owed 
by an owner of property to a business visitor is defined in 
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 3 Utah 2d 203, 
282 P. 2d 304, as follows: 
"The duty owed by an owner of land to a busi-
ness visitor is to inspect and maintain his premises 
in a reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor 
of any dangerous condition thereon." 
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The duty of a governmental agency which lets a I por-
tion of premises, otherwise governmental for a private un-
dertaking to maintain the common hallways and passage-
way in a reasonably safe condition is set out in the cases 
of Lowe v. Salt Lake City, supra, Chafor v. City of Long 
Beach, supra, and Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, supra. 
In the Lowe case the court held that the failure to pro-
vide adequate light to illuminate an open hatchway or to 
warn plaintiff of the danger was negligence which would . 
support a cause of action against Salt Lake City. In that 
case the court said : 
"* * * We think that the leaving of the 
hatchway in an unguarded and unprotected condi-
tion by the defendant, as shown by the evidence, 
and the failure to have any light in the yard by 
which its condition could be seen, was such negli-
gence as rendered it liable for any injury which was 
caused thereby. While the owner or occupant of 
premises is not an insurer of them against accidents 
from their condition, still, so far as he is able to do 
so by the exercise of ordinary care and vigilance, he 
is bound to keep them in such a condition that per-
sons who are rightfully using them will not be in-
jured by any insecurity or insufficiency for the pur-
pose to which they are put. If such owner or occu-
pant fails in his duty in these regards, he becomes 
a wrongdoer, and as such will be liable for any 
injury which results as a natural consequence from 
his misconduct, and which might reasonably have 
been anticipated as likely to occur as a natural and 
probable result thereof. * * * In the case at 
bar the defendant, by invitation, and leasing of the 
premises, induced the respondent to come upon them 
for a legitimate purpose, knowing their dangerous 
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condition, without giving him notice thereof. It 
was therefore liable to him for the injury, in the 
absence of contributory negligence on his part." 
In Dineen v. City and County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. 
App. 2d 486, 101 P. 2d 736, the court answered the very 
question now before this court in the following language: 
"[I] f a governmental agency permits part or 
whole of a building to be used for other than govern-
mental purposes, then the agency is generally liable 
in tort to any person who is injured by reason of 
the negligent maintenance or operation of the build-
ing, if such injury occurs in the common hallways, 
passages or yard of such building or in the portion 
used for nongovernmental purposes." 
There can be no question in this case but what the 
county knew of the obstruction caused by the concrete abut-
ment. Indeed this condition was allowed to remain on the 
premises for a period of six or seven years before the acci-
dent (R. 228). It is also clear that the county did not 
undertake to furnish any artificial light in the hallway up 
to the time of the accident. The county also knew that vir-
tually all of the natural light furnished to said hallway 
from outside sources had been blocked off by the erection 
of the scoreboard against the glass block. The county's own 
employee (Riley) was the person who erected the score-
board and the dangerous condition was allowed to remain 
for at least three weeks before the accident occurred (R. 
242, 243) . During all of this time the county not only had 
knowledge of the condition of the hallway through its em-
ployee Riley but it actively caused the same by the erection 
of the scoreboard, the maintenance of the concrete obstruc-
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tion and the failure to provide any artificial light or to post 
warning signs or give other notice of the hazard. 
It was urged by the county at the time of trial that 
it was not responsible for the safety of patrons of the Open 
Tournament as it was not deriving any income from the 
tournament and had in effect turned the premises over to 
the Salt Lake Jaycees and the Meadow Brook Golf Club 
who co-sponsored the tournament. This argument does not 
answer the plain fact that the county was at all times in 
possession through its lessee, Jessie Smith, and was respon-
sible at the very least, to see that the common hallways were 
maintained in a reasonably safe condition. Nor can the 
county escape the fact that its employee, Riley, the person 
who actually erected the scoreboard was acting within the 
scope of his contract of employment in erecting the score-
board and failing to provide artificial light. This seems 
inescapable for the contract of employment actually con-
templated the promotion of "men's open or amateur golf 
tournament each year" (Ex. 24-P) and the Utah Open was 
conducted at Meadow Brook just as it would be conducted 
at any privately owned club. Riley's contract gave him 
express authority to conduct such a tournament. How can 
it be said that he was not acting within the scope of his 
authority in the planning and conduct of the tournament? 
The county in holding this tournament was not only ful-
filling its duty as a golf course to the game of golf in taking 
its turn to hold the Utah Open (R. 257) but there were 
likely decided benefits in doing so in the form of increased 
patronage of the lessee during the tournament (the county 
got a share of the gross proceeds) and the focusing of public 
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interest on the course during the actual play of the tourna-
ment which would result in an increase of future green fees. 
Even had the county (contrary to the facts in this case) 
relinquished complete control of the premises and had there 
been no lessee in possession or employee acting for it, it 
would be liable for injury caused by the dangerous condi-
tion thereon at the time the tournament opened. See § 359, 
Restatement of Torts and Comments (a) and (c) to said 
sections. Jopes was on the premises as a participant in the 
tournament. Salt Lake County could certainly not have 
expected that the sponsors of the tournament would install 
artificial lights and remove the concrete obstruction. Nor 
could they reasonably expect the scoreboard to be removed 
before the completion of the tournament. 
In summary we submit that there was ample evidence 
from which a jury might reasonably have found that a 
dangerous condition existed in the hallway where plaintiff 
was injured and that the county failed to exercise reason-
able care to make said hallway safe or to warn plaintiff 
of the danger therein. The evidence in the instant case not 
only shows the existence of a dangerous condition and a 
failure to warn of the hazard but also compels the conclu-
sion that the hazard was created by the county's employee 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
(4) The Evidence Does Not Compel a Conclusion 
That Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory 
Negligence as a Matter of Law. 
The testimony of J opes was that he had been in the 
hallway before the time of the accident; that he did not 
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see the concrete obstruction on said occasions and did not 
know it was there until he tripped over it (R. 166). He 
said that the hallway was dimly lighted; that he was watch-
ing where he was going but could not see the abutment 
before he fell (R. 122). His testimony was corroborated 
by Paul Gore who also testified as to the light conditions 
and who though watching where he was going also tripped 
over the abutment and caught another golfer as he fell over 
the same (R. 277, 278). From this testimony it appears 
that the hallway was neither extremely dark nor was it 
light, but was dimly lighted particularly below the concrete 
foundation to which the abutment was attached. It further 
appears that a traveler's view of any obstruction along the 
wall was so obscured by the light conditions as to prevent 
his seeing it. It is also significant that J opes was passing 
another golfer in the hallway at the time of the accident 
and was probably devoting that degree of care in doing so 
that any other person would have done in passing someone 
in a narrow hallway. Is it for the court to say that no rea-
sonable minds could find that J opes was exercising the care 
of a reasonably prudent person in traversing the hallway? 
How can it be said from these facts that J opes was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
This court in Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 
3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304, under circumstances much 
less favorable to the plaintiff than those in the instant case 
refused to hold that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. In that case Rogalski was 
engaged in steam cleaning a truck on a ramp owned by 
defendant. There was a tank of caustic acid on the ramp 
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with no lid on it, but Rogalski's view of the tank was ob-
scured by a mist caused by the steam he was using to clean 
the truck. He testified that if he had stepped back "and 
waited a minute the steam would clear." Instead of waiting 
for the mist to clear, however, he felt his way around the 
truck and stumbled into the vat of acid. Of these facts the 
court said: 
"It has been frequently announced by this court 
that contributory negligence is a question for the 
jury unless all reasonable men must draw the same 
conclusion from the facts as they are shown. Shafer 
v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300, 38 
A. L. R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 
44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708; Baker v. Decker, 
117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679. As was said in Linden 
v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58 P. 355, 358: 
"'Where there is uncertainty as to the ex-
istence of either negligence or contributory neg-
ligence, the question is not one of law, but of 
fact, and to be settled by a jury ; and this, 
whether the uncertainty arises from a conflict 
in the testimony, or because, the facts being 
undisputed, fair-minded men will honestly draw 
different conclusions from them.' 
"In the present case, although there is no con-
flict in the evidence on this question, the triers of 
the facts might justifiably conclude that a person, 
acting with due regard for his own safety and with 
no awareness of the presence of a dangerous liquid, 
could not be required to inspect the premises for 
possible hazards. * * *" 
Lowe v. Salt Lake City, supra, involved a similar ques-
tion. In that case plaintiff, because of insufficient light 
stepped into an open hatchway and was injured. The court 
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concluded that he was not guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law in walking into the dark yard beside the 
path to the outhouse. See also Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 
15, 212 P. 2d 679, where the court held that contributory 
negligence is a question of fact for the jury unless all rea-
sonable minds are compelled by undisputed evidence to find 
that plaintiff did not exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety. Commenting on this the court said: 
"* * * Ordinary reasonable persons wiU 
trip over objects, stumble over obstructions, slip on 
slick surfaces and fall into holes or excavations. 
Even though they may see the object they some-
times fail to comprehend and anticipate the incident 
which precipitates the injury. Usually whether a 
reasonable person would have properly appraised 
the situation and escaped injury is for a jury to de-
termine." (Emphasis added.) 
One of the defendants suggested to the trial judge 
below that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law in traversing the hallway instead of tak-
ing an alternate route. The hallway was maintained for 
the use of patrons such as plaintiff. He had no reason to 
expect, in the absence of any warning, that there was a 
dangerous condition in said hallway nor that he would be 
taking an unusual risk in using the same. This defendant's 
contention in this respect seems to us too ridiculous to re-
quire rebuttal. In any event it is fully answered by the 
cases of Baker v. Decke1·, supra, and Moore v. 11Iiles, 108 
Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676. 
We submit that the issue of contributory negligence 
was under the circumstances of this case a question for the 
fact finders and should have been submitted to the jury. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JO-
SEPH MICHAEL RILEY. 
Riley was employed by the county as a manager of the 
course. It was his duty among other things to maintain the 
facilities. He had both the right and the duty to see that 
changes were made in the facilities if in his judgment they 
were necessary. He knew of the obstruction in the hallway; 
he knew of the traffic in the hallway and particularly that 
people often passed each other and needed all possible clear-
ance in the narrow passage; he knew that there were no 
artificial lights to illuminate the obstruction; it was his 
duty to install lights if the same were reasonably necessary; 
he caused the scoreboards to be erected which blocked out 
the natural light from said passageway, and when the haz-
ard was complete, he sat back with full knowledge of the 
hazardous condition until the accident occurred. Certainly 
it was a jury question as to whether or not Riley was guilty 
of negligence which proximately contributed to plaintiff's 
injuries. In our opinion the evidence compelled a finding 
that Riley was negligent. In any event it certainly must be 
concluded that reasonable minds might have found that all 
or any of the acts and omissions above outlined constituted 
actionable negligence. The case, therefore should have been 
allowed to go to the jury on the issue of Riley's liability. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT MEA-
DOW BROOK GOLF CLUB. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANT JUN-
IOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. 
The Salt Lake Jaycees and the Meadow Brook Golf 
Club were co-sponsors of the Utah Open Golf Tournament. 
The tournament was planned and managed by a general 
committee of three, including Kipp of the Jaycees, Gilbert 
of Meadow Brook and Riley the golf pro. Meadow Brook 
Golf Club and the Jaycees furnished supervision, manage-
ment and labor and in return for their joint contribution 
each of the said co-sponsors, according to agreement, di-
vided the net profits of the tournament. These profits 
amounted to several hundreds of dollars. This is the clear-
est case of the legal relationship of "joint venture." 
See e. g. Kaumans v. White 
Star Gas & Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 63 P. 2d 231. 
30 Am. Jur. 680. 
This being true each of said defendants are jointly and 
severally liable as joint tort feasors for personal injuries 
sustained by others as a result of negligence in the conduct 
of the joint enterprise or from negligence of their agents 
or employees acting within the scope of their employment. 
Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., supra. 
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Since the liability of Meadow Brook Golf Club and the Salt 
Lake Jaycees is the same, Points III and IV will be dis-
cussed together. 
We have already pointed out under Point I (3) supra, 
that plaintiff's injuries were caused by a hazardous con-
dition existing in the hallway where he was injured. There 
are two compelling reasons why Meadow Brook Golf Club 
and the Jaycees as well as the other named defendants were 
responsible to plaintiff for this hazard: ( 1) The Golf Club 
and the Jaycees as possessors of the Meadow Brook Golf 
Club during the duration of the tournament and as proprie-
tors of the tournament owed a duty to plaintiff to exercise 
reasonable care to see that the premises were in a reason-
ably safe condition, and (2) Riley in placing the scoreboard 
over the east wall of the passageway was acting as the 
agent of the Golf Club and of the Jaycees. 
As to the first of said theories, the Golf Club and 
Jaycees took possession of the course for the conduct of the 
tournament and invited participants and spectators from 
whom they exacted an admission fee. The greens and fair-
ways were, of course, essential to their operation. No less 
essential, however, were the locker rooms, rest rooms, and 
golf shop, all lo~ated within the clubhouse. The plaintiff, 
J opes, was on the course by invitation and for the purpose 
of the tournament. He had paid the required admission 
fee which became part of the income collected by the co-
adventurers. Spectators of the tournament paid a "gallery 
fee" which came into the same hands. The duty of the 
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Jaycees and the Golf Club toward J opes is defined in thE 
Restatement of Torts as follows : 
"Topic 1. Liability of Possessors of Land tc 
Persons Thereon. 
"Title A. Definitions. 
* * 
"§ 329. * * * 
"Comment: 
* * * 
"a. Meaning of 'possessor of land.' The words 
'possessor of land,' as used in the Restatement of 
this subject, mean: 
"'1. A person who is in occupation of 
land with intent to control it, or 
"'2. * * *' 
"Title E. Special Liability of Possessors of 
Land to Business Visitors. 
"§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or 
Discoverable by Possessor. 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural 
or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he 
" ' (a) knows, or by the exercise of rea-
sonable care could discover, the condition which, 
if known to him, he should realize as involving 
an unreasonable risk to them, and 
"'(b) has no reason to believe that they 
will discover the condition or realize the risk 
involved therein, and 
" ' (c) invites or permits them to enter or 
remain upon the land without exercising reason-
able care 
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" ' ( i) to make the condition reason-
ably safe, or 
" '(ii) to give a warning adequate to 
enable them to avoid the harm without re-
linquishing any of the services which they 
are entitled to receive, if the possessor is 
a public utility.'" 
As pointed out supra, page 35, the undisputed evidence 
compels the conclusion that plaintiff was a business visitor 
under the facts of the instant case. (Even had he been a 
mere gratuitous licensee, however, the standard of care 
was not met, See § 342, Restatement of Torts.) 
It is undisputed that the Golf Club and the Jaycees 
knew of the condition existing there and invited plaintiff 
upon the premises without doing anything to alter the con-
dition or to warn plaintiff. Certainly it was for the jury 
to say whether or not the condition involved an "unreason-
able risk" and whether or not the co-adventurers had reason 
to believe that plaintiff would not discover the condition 
or realize the danger. 
It is no answer to urge that the Golf Club and Jaycees 
had no right to alter the physical conditions which existed 
at the course. They cannot absolve themselves from lia-
bility for injuries caused to persons whom they invited on 
the premises by any such simple device. No exception is 
made in the above stated rule of law which would permit 
proprietors to invite and admit patrons to premises they 
possess and then contend they had no duty for the safety 
of said patrons because they had no right to alter the 
premises. Another reason why this contention must fail 
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is that one of the most significant contributing , factors tc 
the hazard was the placement of the scoreboard. This board 
was constructed for the express purpose of the joint enter. 
prise in putting on the Utah Open. A jury might well have 
found, and we think would be compelled to find, that the 
placement and maintenance of this scoreboard was a deci-
sion to be made by the general tournament committee and 
a matter over which said committee had the right of sup-
ervision, direction and control. 
It cannot be reasonably concluded, as a matter of law, 
that the co-adventurers had no responsibility for conditions 
existing in the building. Their operation required the use 
of the building-particularly the locker rooms, rest rooms 
and golf shop. The securing of change to pay a caddy as 
plaintiff was doing was a necessary activity for any tourna-
ment. When golfers were invited to the tournament the 
invitation necessarily extended to the clubhouse as well as 
the greens and hallways. 
As a second reason for the liability of the Golf Club 
and the Jaycees, we submit that there was ample evidence 
from which the jury could have found that Riley was acting 
for said defendants as an agent in the placement of the 
scoreboard. We have already shown why the placement of 
the scoreboard over the glass wall of the hallway consti-
tuted negligence. Riley testified that the board was made 
for the "express purpose of using in the Utah Open Tourna-
ment" ( R. 260) . The placement of the board was taken up 
by Riley with Kipp and Gilbert, the other members of the 
r~·cneral committee, as one of the items of business of the 
tournament (R. 243, 244, 309). Although Kipp did not 
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recall the discussion Gilbert did remember a discussion as 
to the placement of the sign (R. 309). 
It would appear that the actual location of the sign 
was made more as a result of Riley's judgment than that of 
the other two general chairmen. The court should note that 
Riley was making a number of decisions after having con-
sulted the co-sponsors. The reason for this is explained by 
Riley himself as follows : 
(R. 236) 
"They were using me of my knowledge and ex-
perience in running open tournaments." 
The very fact that Riley was one of the three members of 
the general committee seems to us conclusive evidence that 
he was acting for said committee and said co-sponsors in 
performing work in furtherance of the tournament. It is 
undisputed that what he did was with the full knowledge 
and consent of the other two committee members. The very 
placement of the sign was a task done in furtherance of 
the enterprise conducted by the co-adventurers. We think 
that this court will agree with us that there is sufficient 
evidence from which a jury might find that Riley was act-
ing as agent for the enterprise and for the co-adventurers 
in placing the scoreboard where it was placed. 
It follows that the liability of the defendants Meadow 
Brook Golf Club and Salt Lake Jaycees was an issue which 
should have been submitted to the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing we submit that the trial cour 
erred in dismissing the complaint and that the case shoul1 
be remanded to the district court for a new trial to de 
termine the liability of each of the defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE JR., 
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Suite 300, 65 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
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